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NOTE

THE SUPREME COURT'S NOT SO CLEAR
STATEMENT IN: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N V. ARABIAN
AMERICAN OIL CO.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a strong presumption against the extrater-

ritorial application of U.S. labor laws in federal caselaw.'
However, U.S. courts have universally recognized that Congress possesses the authority to pass laws that have extraterritorial effects.2 These courts regularly state that Congress'
clearly expressed affirmative intent is necessary to overcome
this presumption against extraterritoriality.3

The Supreme Court has recently decided that Congress
must put a "clear statement" of its intent to apply a law

extraterritorially on the face of the statute in EEOC v.
Aramco.4 However, the Court then failed to heed its own "clear
statement" rule and looked beyond the face of the statute for
other indicia of congressional intent to extraterritorially apply

the law at issue.5 In its analysis, the Court looked to such

1. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
2. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244, 248 (1991); Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 284-85; Benz v. Compania Naviera
Hidalgo, SA., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957).
3. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285.
4. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248. The Court explained that "[i]n applying this rule
of construction, we look to see whether 'language in the [relevant act] gives any
indication of a congressional purpose to extend its coverage beyond places over
which the United States has sovereignty or has some measure of legislative control.'" Id. (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285) (emphasis added).
5. The Aramco decision involved a Title VII claim brought by plaintiff, Ali
Bourselan, against defendants, Arabian American Oil Company, and Aramco Ser-
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sources of congressional intent as the provision, or lack thereof,

for a conflict of laws with other nations6 and administrative
interpretations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).' Therefore, although the Court established a
rather clear and concise standard by which to judge extraterritoriality, its own analysis in that same decision sowed the
seeds of confusion that would soon be reaped by the lower
courts.
The inconsistency of the Aramco decision has confused the
federal courts as to how they should determine whether Congress intended for a law to apply extraterritorially. Specifically,
this confusion has caused a conflict among the circuits as to
the interpretation of broad language in U.S. labor laws.8 The
plain language of these labor laws seemingly gives courts the
requisite jurisdiction over the disputes before them. However,
these laws are regularly not applied extraterritorially for fear
of creating foreign policy conflicts for the United States which
Congress did not intend.9 Therefore, a Supreme Court ruling
which allows for split decisions and interpretations among the
ranks of the Circuit Courts of Appeal is particularly troublesome due to the ramifications these conflicts may have.
Although it has been overruled by Congre-, ° Aramco is
vice Company under Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to e-17 (1988).
Aranwo, 499 U.S. at 244.
6. "It is also reasonable to conclude that had Congress intended Title VII to

apply overseas, it would have addressed the subject of conflicts with foreign laws
and procedures." Id. at 256.
7. "We are of the view that, even when considered in combination with
petitioner's other arguments, the EEOC's interpretation is insufficiently weighty to
overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application." Id. at 258 (empha-

sis added). This statement leaves one to draw the negative inference that had this
interpretation been "sufficiently weighty," then the presumption against extraterritoriality would have been overcome without such intent being expressly stated on
the face of the statute. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.

8. See Labor Union of Pico Korea, Ltd. v. Pico Products, Inc., 968 F.2d 191
(2d Cir. 1992) (holding that Labor Management Relations Act did not apply to
issue of whether American parent corporation was liable as alter ego for South

Korean subsidiary's alleged breach of collective bargaining agreement); cf. Dowd v.
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 975 F.2d 779 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that

National Labor Relations Act applied to conduct of U.S. union while abroad).
9. See Pico, 968 F.2d 191; Aramco, 499 U.S. at 264-65 (Marshall, J., dissent-

ing).
10. In direct response to Aranco and other Supreme Court decisions limiting
the extraterritorial application of U.S. labor laws, Congress enacted the Civil

Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). See Louise B.
Moses, Comment, 16 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 240, 253-54 n.* (1992) ("Under
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an extremely important decision t6 focus upon when discussing
the extraterritorial application of U.S. labor laws. First,
Aramco is the latest indication of how the Supreme Court will
decide cases involving extraterritoriality. Second, Congress'
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provided the Court with
the clear statement it required, implying that Aramco's clear
statement rule has been accepted by Congress. Thus, the
Aramco decision has won the day as far as Congress is concerned. However, the Court needs to refine its analysis in order to promote certainty and consistency in the lower federal
courts, lest its decision be misinterpreted and congressional
intent go unheeded.
Part II of this Note reviews the history of the presumption
against extraterritoriality in U.S. caselaw. Part II.A discusses
both the majority and dissenting opinions of the Aramco decision. Part II.B reviews the Second Circuit's 1992 decision
against the extraterritorial application of U.S. labor laws in
Labor Union of Pico Korea, Ltd. v. Pico Products, Inc." and
its interpretation of Aramco. Part II.C analyzes the Eleventh
Circuit's 1992 decision which extraterritorially applied U.S.
labor law in Dowd v. InternationalLongshoremen's Assoc."2 as
well as that court's novel interpretation of the Aramco decision. Part II.D compares and contrasts the approaches taken
by the Pico and Dowd courts which yielded different results
regarding extraterritoriality.
In Part IM, this Note concludes that the Supreme Court
needs to more clearly delineate and apply its so-called "clear
statement" rule in order to allow the lower federal courts to
determine exactly what is needed to overcome the presumption
against the extraterritorial application of U.S. labor laws. The
Court should also acknowledge that it has altered the standard
by which U.S. labor laws are held to apply extraterritorially by
requiring a clear statement of such intent to be included on the
face of the statute. The absence of this acknowledgment has
caused confusion in the lower courts, as illustrated by a comparison of the Pico and Dowd cases and their respective inter-

the 1991 Act, Congress expanded the definition of an 'employee' who is protected
from discrimination under Title VII to include individuals who are United States

citizens employed in a foreign country." (citing Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 109)).
11. 968 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1992).
12. 975 F.2d 779 (11th Cir. 1992).
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pretations of the Aramco decision.
In an increasingly interdependent world where business is
commonly conducted on a multinational level, establishing a
clear standard for exactly when a U.S. labor law will apply
extraterritorially is of great importance due to the ramifications such application may have." U.S. corporations should be
informed of when U.S. labor laws will apply extraterritorially
so that they may -properly evaluate the decision to relocate
overseas and be able to conduct themselves accordingly once
abroad. Foreign governments should be aware of when U.S.
labor laws will reach beyond American shores and touch conduct occurring in their jurisdictions so as to avoid foreign policy clashes with the United States. Finally, and most importantly, the Supreme Court should provide Congress with a
clear standard governing the extraterritorial application of
U.S. labor laws so that the people's representatives may properly react either by acquiescing to federal court decisions with
which it agrees or by amending the statute at issue so as to
overrule such decisions with which it does not. 4
Congress has shown that the clear statement rule is a
viable and workable standard under which to operate by its
reaction to judicial decisions refusing to apply U.S. labor laws
extraterritorially. 5 While Aramco has confused the federal
courts as to just what is necessary in order to apply a U.S. law
extraterritorially, this Note shows that Congress has taken the
13. See Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the ExtraterritorialReach of U.S.
Law, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1 (1992) (arguing that the presumption against
extraterritorial application of U.S. labor laws is increasingly unworkable in a
shrinking world); see also Frank Balzano, Comment, ExtraterritorialApplication of
the National Labor Relations Act, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 573 (1993) (contending that
U.S. labor laws were designed at a time when the issue of extraterritorial application of labor statutes was not particularly important for resolution of labor disputes).
14. See, for example, 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988), which Congress amended to
provide, "[t]he term 'employee' includes any individual who is a citizen of the
United States employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign country." This
amendment was in direct response to cases such as Cleary v. United States Lines,
728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984), which held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988), did not apply extraterritorially.
15. See, e.g., Renee S. Orleans, Comment, ExtraterritorialEmployment Protection Amendments of 1991: Congress Protects U.S. Citizens Who Work for U.S.
Companies Abroad, 16 ID. J. INTL L. & TRADE 147, 160-65 (1992) (discussing
congressional amendment of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
[ADEA to apply overseas in order to overrule such cases as Cleary v. United
States Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984)).
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standard to mean that any intention to extraterritorially apply
U.S. labor laws must appear on the face of the statute. In

addition to being a workable standard, the clear statement rule
should be maintained because it gives Congress, and not the

courts, the final word on whether a U.S. labor law should be
applied extraterritorially. Congress should maintain this power
because it is better able to evaluate the foreign policy ramifications of applying U.S. labor laws extraterritorially and is in a
better position than the courts to balance competing American
labor and business interests.

II.

THE HISTORY
EXTRATERRITORIALITY

OF

THE

PRESUMPTION

AGAINST

The presumption against the extraterritorial application of

U.S. laws dates back nearly two hundred years, to the Charming Betsy case.' Following this decision, the Supreme Court

decided several subsequent cases concluding that while Congress was supreme within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, the federal courts must presume against the
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws unless Congress clearly
expresses an intent to do otherwise.'7
The presumption against extraterritoriality continued in
this century with American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.'
In that decision, the Court refused to apply the Sherman Antitrust Act 9 to occurrences that had taken place in Costa Rica

and modern-day Panama," although both parties to the dis-

16. Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U S. 64 (1804). The case, decided by Chief
Justice Marshall, refused to punish a naturalized Danish citizen for violation of a
law that, at the time, placed an embargo on trade with France and her colonies.
Id. "[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains .

. . ."

Id. at 118.

17. See, e.g., Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 122-23 (1812) ("It
is beautiful in theory to exclaim 'fiat Justitia-ruat coelum, but justice is to be
administered with a due regard to the law of nations, and to the rights of other
sovereigns."); cf. Vrildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 18 (1887) ('The principle which
governs the whole matter is this: Disorders which disturb only the peace of the
[foreign] ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty
of the home of the ship, but those which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished, by the proper authorities of the
local jurisdiction.") (emphasis added).
18. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-36 (1988).
20. American Banana, 213 U.S. at 357.
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pute were American citizens.21 Justice Holmes reasoned that
the United States could not declare foreign practices illegal
merely because they violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.22
The American Banana case is notable for the attention it
paid to many of the policy considerations that continue to concern the federal judiciary today. Indeed, in some respects,
American Banana may have been the progenitor to the confusion regarding the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws that
exists today. First, the Court was concerned that the broad
jurisdictional language of U.S. laws would be construed as
applying to extraterritorial situations when Congress did not
so intend.' Next, the Court worried that these unintended
extraterritorial judicial applications of U.S. law would conflict
with the laws of other nations and cause foreign policy problems for the United States.24 Finally, American Banana established the background rule by which all extraterritorial applications of U.S. law are to be governedY That rule dictates
that there is a strong presumption against the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law which may be overcome only in rare
instances.26 It is this background rule that predominates the

21. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (holding that a U.S.
citizen residing abroad is subject to punishment in U.S. court for disobedience of
U.S. laws overseas).
22. "A conspiracy in this country [the United States] to do acts in another
jurisdiction does not draw to itself those acts and make them unlawful, if they are
permitted by the local law." American Banana, 213 U.S. at 359.
23. "Words having universal scope, such as 'every contract in restraint of
trade,' 'every person who shall monopolize,' etc., will be taken, as a matter of
course, to mean only every one subject to such legislation, not all that the legislator subsequently may be able to catch." Id. at 357 (emphasis added).
24. The Court stated:
For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to
treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the place
where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of
nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent.
Id. at 356.
25. "But the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act
as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where
the act is done." Id. (citation omitted).
26. As the Court explained:
It is obvious that, however stated, the plaintiff's case depends on several
rather startling propositions. In the first place, the acts causing the damage were done, so far as appears, outside the jurisdiction of the United
States, and within that of other states. It is surprising to hear it argued
that they were governed by the act of Congress [Sherman Antitrust Act].
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discussion of any extraterritorial issue by the federal courts
since American Banana was decided.'
Forty years after American Banana, the Supreme Court
restated the presumption against extraterritoriality in Foley
Bros. v. Filardo.Y The case involved a cook employed by a
construction company which had contracted with the U.S.
government to do public works projects abroad.2 9 The employee brought suit against the company demanding compensation
at one-and-a-half times his normal wages for overtime that he
had allegedly worked while overseas." The suit was brought
under the 'Eight Hour Law"3 which, at the time, provided for
such overtime compensation for anyone employed by a contractor working for the U.S. government."
In Foley Bros., the Court assumed that Congress clearly
had the power to apply U.S. laws overseas' and framed the
extraterritorial application issue regarding the 'Eight Hour
Law" as a question of congressional intent.' First, the Court
searched the face of the statute for any plainly worded indications that Congress intended the extraterritorial application of
the law in question." Second, the Court evaluated the
"scheme of the [act itself' and decided that it "butresse[d]" its
conclusion that the 'Eight Hour Law" was not meant to be
applied abroad. 6 Third, the Court explored the legislative

Id. at 355.
27. See, e.g., Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 287 n.3 (1949) (broad language of U.S. laws must be modified by presumption against extraterritoriality)
(quoting American Banana, 213 U.S. at 357); cf. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344
U.S. 280, 288-89 (1952) (holding American Banana was not an obstacle to applica-

tion of Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988), to acts done in Mexico with
intent and effect of trademark infringement in United States).
28. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 287 n.3 (addressing the way policy concerns
should modify interpretation of broad language in labor law statutes that seemingly provide jurisdiction) (quoting American Banana, 213 U.S. at 357).
29. Id. at 283.
30. Id.
31. 40 U.S.C. §§ 321-326 (repealed 1962).
32. See Foley Bros., 336 U.S at 282-83 (quoting 40 U.S.C. § 325a (repealed
1962)).
33. "The question before us is not the power of Congress to extend the Eight
Hour Law to work performed in foreign countries. Petitioners concede that such
power exists." Id. at 284 (citing Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932));
United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
34. Id. at 284-85.
35. Id. at 285.
36. Id. at 286.
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history of the "Eight Hour Law" and found that "the considerations before Congress were domestic unemployment, the influx of cheap foreign labor, and the need for improved labor
conditions in this country."3' 7 Finally, the Court summarized
its analysis by looking to administrative interpretations of the
"Eight Hour Law" and found no conflict with its conclusion
that the law did not apply overseas."
In subsequent decisions, the federal courts often relied on
the analytical framework of Foley Bros. to decide whether Congress intended a U.S. law to apply extraterritorially.3 9 The
Foley Bros. decision did not indicate that any analysis of extraterritorial application issues should stop at the face of the
statute. Instead, the Court employed a broad method of statutory interpretation which examined a diverse range of materials in order to deduce the legislative intent behind a statute.
Indeed, many cases following Foley Bros. gave no indication
that the face of the statute was to be the only source of congressional intent." It is in this respect that the Aramco decision has modified the rule of Foley Bros. and its progeny.
A. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Aramco
1. The Majority Opinion
Aramco represents a break with the Foley Bros. decision
and its progeny, in that it ostensibly limited to the face of the
statute any inquiry into whether a law was meant to apply
extraterritorially. While the Aramco Court voiced the same
concerns as the Court in Foley Bros., it did not follow the broad

37. Id. at 286-87.

38. "We conclude that administrative interpretations of the Act, although not
specifically directed at the precise problem before us, tend to support petitioners'
contention as to its restricted geographical scope" Id. at 290.
39. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282-283 (1952). In
Steele, although the court extraterritorially applied the Lanham Act, supra note
27, it used the Foley Bros. analytical framework.
40. See, e.g., Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1957)

(looking to legislative history and "background" of National Labor Relations Act of
1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)));
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 19 (1963)

("Petitioners ... have been unable to point to any specific language in the [National Labor Relations] Act itself or in its extensive legislative history that reflects
such a congressional intent.") (emphasis added); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571,
579 (1953) (looking to "history" of the Jones Act, ch. 153, 38 Stat. 1185 (1915)
(current version at 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988))).
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statutory analysis established by that decision. Instead, it
formulated the clear statement rule which required that any
congressional intent to apply a law extraterritorially be explicitly included on the face of the statute. Although claiming to
apply this newly formed clear statement rule, the Aramco
Court inconsistently looked for a conflict of laws with other
nations and evaluated the administrative interpretations of the
EEOC. It is this inconsistency which has allowed for the subsequent confusion illustrated in the Pico and Dowd decisions
discussed later in this Note.
The Aramco decision involved a naturalized American
citizen of Lebanese descent who was employed, in Saudi Arabia, by the Arabian American Oil Company, commonly known
as "Aramco. 41 The employee brought a Title VII42 suit
against Aramco alleging that he had suffered employment
discrimination and was ultimately fired because of his race,
religion, and national origin.43 The acts of which the plaintiff
complained all occurred in Saudi Arabia. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the
action on the grounds that it did not have jurisdiction.44 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the decision of the district court.45 Upon rehearing, a deeply
divided Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reaffirmed the decision against Bourselan, who by that time had been joined by
the EEOC as a plaintiff." The Supreme Court affirmed both
of the Court of Appeals' decisions and held that Congress did
not intend for Title VII to apply extraterritorially.47
The Aramco Court relied on Foley Bros. and Benz for the
proposition that Title VII could be applied extraterritorially
only with 'the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly
expressed."'48 However, the Supreme Court restricted the
41. EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to e-15 (1988). See supra note 10 and accompanying

text for Congress' amendment of Title V11 giving it extraterritorial application in
response to Aramco.
43. Aranco, 499 U.S. at 247.
44. Id.; Bourselan v. Aramco, 653 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
45. Aranco, 499 U.S. at 247; Bourselan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir.
1988).
46. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 247; Bourselan v. Aramco, 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir.
1990) (en banc).
47. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 259.
48. Id. at 248 (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147
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search for this intent to the face of the statute by selectively
quoting Foley Bros.49 and by ignoring the other sources of congressional intent to which the majority looked in Foley Bros.
and its progeny. The Court then addressed the arguments put
forth by the Solicitor General" on behalf of the EEOC, contending that Title VII was meant to be applied overseas. First,
petitioners claimed that the words "employer" and "commerce"
by themselves were sufficiently broad for Title VII to encompass the acts in question.5 ' Second, petitioners claimed that
Title VII's "alien exemption" provision," which stated that the
statute would not apply to employers who hired aliens outside
of any state, clearly indicated that Title VII could be applied to
U.S. employers who hired U.S. citizens outside of the United
States.53
The Court summarily rejected petitioners' first argument.
Relying upon Foley Bros. and its progeny, the Court made
clear that the broad language of U.S. labor laws must be tempered by policy concerns such as the avoidance of conflicts of
law with other nations.' The Court stated that broad terms
such as "employer" and "commerce," without more, are not
enough to provide the bases for the extraterritorial application
of U.S. labor laws.55 Indeed, the Court stated that these "boil(1957)).
49. "In applying this rule of construction [the presumption against extraterri-

toriality], we look to see whether 'language in the [relevant Act] gives any indication of a congressional purpose to extend its coverage beyond places over which
the United States has sovereignty or has some measure of legislative control.'" Id.
at 248 (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). Justice

Marshall criticized that "[t]he majority convert[ed] the presumption against extraterritoriality into a clear-statement rule in part through selective quotation." Id. at
263 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

50. The case was argued on behalf of the Bush administration by then-Solicitor General, Kenneth Starr, who recently replaced Robert Fiske as independent
counsel in the Whitewater investigation of President and Hillary Clinton. See Top
Whitewater Prosecutor Replaced, Star Trib., Aug. 6, 1994, available in LEXIS,

News Library, STRIB File.
51. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248-49. See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 [LMRDA], 29 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1988), for thedefinition of "commerce" incorporated into Title VII. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (Supp. V 1993)

for Title VI's definition of "employer."
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1988).
53. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 249-51.

54. "It [the presumption against extraterritoriality] serves to protect against
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result
in international discord." Id. at 248 (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional do
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22 (1963)).

55. "Petitioner's reliance on Title VIis jurisdictional provisions ... finds no
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er plate' 5' terms must always be defeated by the presumption
against extraterritoriality or the presumption will be left with
no effect. 7
Next, the Court addressed petitioners' argument that the
alien-exemption provision of Title VII5 indicated a clear congressional intent for the extraterritorial application of Title
VII. 59 Petitioners contended that a negative inference drawn
from the alien exemption provision "'clearly manifest[ed] an
intention' by Congress to protect U.S. citizens with respect to
their employment outside of the United States." 0 The provision states, in part, that Title VII "shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside of any
62
State."' The Court rejected petitioners' argument in toto,
fearing the policy ramifications of applying U.S. anti-discrimination statutes abroad.63
Aramco's result is not particularly remarkable since there
have been many cases where congressional authority has been
confined to the territorial limits of the United States. What is
notable and troubling about Aramco is the way in which its
conclusion was reached. The Court ignored all of the usual
material used to deduce congressional intent behind a statute
support in our case law; we have repeatedly held that even statutes that contain
broad language in their definitions of 'commerce' that expressly refer to 'foreign
commerce' do not apply abroad." Id. at 251.
56. See id. at 249-51 (stating boiler plate language never previously applied
overseas is not enough to overcome presumption against extraterritoriality). The
negative inference to be drawn from this statement is that boiler plate language
that has been previously applied overseas may be enough to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.
57. "If we were to permit possible, or even plausible interpretations of language such as that involved here to override the presumption against extraterritorial application, there would be little left of the presumption." Id. at 253.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1988).
59. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 253-56 (discussing and rejecting petitioners' arguments that Title VI's alien exemption provision warranted negative inference that
U.S. citizens are covered when employed by U.S. employers overseas).
60. Id. at 253.
61. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1988)).
62. Id.
63. The Court proclaimed that:
Without clearer evidence of congressional intent to do so than is contained in the alien-exemption clause, we are unwilling to ascribe to that
body a policy which would raise difficult issues of international law by
imposing this country's employment-discrimination regime upon foreign
corporations operating in foreign commerce.
Id. at 255.
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and formulated a new clear statement standard."' It is the
majority's break with precedent and inconsistency in applying
its clear statement standard upon which the dissent focused.
2. The Dissent
The dissent, like the majority, framed the issue of whether
Title VII applies abroad as a function of congressional intent."5 The dissent also recognized that a presumption exists
against the extraterritorial application of U.S. labor laws.66
However, the dissent differed in its method of statutory interpretation, taking issue with the majority's newly-formed clear
statement standard,6 7 and ultimately concluded that Title VII
was meant to apply extraterritorially."
The dissent performed an exhaustive analysis of the Foley
Bros. decision and pointed to all of the various factors that the
Court considered in that case when it determined that Congress did not intend the Eight Hour Law to apply overseas.69
Justice Marshall pointed out that Foley Bros. stood for the
proposition that "legislative history, statutory structure, and
administrative interpretations" are all relevant when deducing
whether Congress intended for a labor law to apply

64. "Congress' awareness of the need to make a clear statement that a statute
applies overseas is amply demonstrated by the numerous occasions in which it has
expressly legislated the extraterritorial application of a statute." Id. at 258 (emphasis added); see also id. at 257-58 (listing examples of Congress' amendment of
statutes to apply extraterritorially).
65. "Like any issue of statutory construction, the question whether Title VII
protects United States citizens from discrimination by United States employers
abroad turns solely on congressional intent." Id. at 260 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added). Also this quote indicates that the dissent believes that this
issue should be treated "1]ike any issue of statutory construction" as opposed to
the new, stricter standard that the majority has formulated. Id.
66. See id.at 261 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo,
336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
67. "But contrary to what one would conclude from the majority's analysis,
this canon is not a 'clear statement' rule, the application of which relieves a court
of the duty to give effect to all available indicia of the legislative will." Id. at 261
(Marshall, J. dissenting).
68. "When these tools [other indications of congressional intent] are brought to
bear on the issue in this case, the conclusion is inescapable that Congress did
intend Title VII to protect United States citizens from discrimiation by United
States employers operating overseas." Id. (Marshall J., dissenting).
69. See id.at 261-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 26-38 and
accompanying text.
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extraterritorially. ° The dissent concluded that "[tihe range of
factors the Court considered in Foley Bros. demonstrates that
the presumption against extraterritoriality is not a 'clear
statement' rule.""'
Indeed, the dissent stated that the majority's "drastic' 2
clear-statement rule is inappropriate when determining the
extraterritorial application of U.S. labor laws, but should only
be used "to shield important values from an insufficiently

strong legislative intent to displace them."7 3 Justice Marshall

implied that the policy concerns focused upon when deciding
extraterritoriality are not among the "important values" mentioned above. 4 The dissent then distinguished the Benz75
and McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hondu-

ras7 cases, stating that both of those cases involved "the separation-of-powers and international-comity questions associated with construing a statute to displace the domestic laws of
another nation."' The dissent concluded that "[niothing nearly so dramatic is at stake when Congress merely seeks
8 to regulate the conduct of United States nationals abroad.'7
The dissent drew upon a much broader range of materials
to determine congressional intent as to the extraterritorial
application of Title VII. These materials included the legisla-

70. Id. at 263 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 262 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 263 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 262 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall cited many cases
which allegedly used the clear-statement rule "to shield important values from an
insufficiently strong legislative intent to displace them." Id. at 262-63 (citing Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601, 603 (1988)) (holding that congressional intent to
preclude judicial review of constitutional claims must be clear to avoid a serious
constitutional question that would arise if federal statutes were construed to deny
any judicial forum for colorable constitutional claims); Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1985) (holding that Congress may abrogate states'
constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its
intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute); Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116, 130 (1958) (holding that where activity exercised by an American citizen
is included in constitutional protection, the courts will not readily infer that Congress gave a government department unbridled discretion to grant or withhold it).
74. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 263 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the
clear-statement rule has never been used to "burden" congressional intent regarding extraterritoriality).
75. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hildalgo, 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
76. 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
77. Ararnco, 499 U.S. at 265 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (citations omitted).
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tive record79 and administrative interpretations of the
EEOC. 0 The dissent not only noted the majority's inconsistency with Foley Bros. and its progeny, but also pointed out
internal inconsistencies within the majority's opinion itself. If a
clear statement by Congress is the only element that is able to
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, then why
did the Court expend so much energy looking for provisions for
conflicts of law with other nations?8 ' Along the same lines,
why did the Court pay such careful attention to the EEOC
interpretations of Title VII"2 and refute them as being "inconV ? If Congress had made a
sistent"
statutory provision for the
conflict of laws, it would seem that such a provision would fail
the majority's clear statement test. Even less persuasive would
be a consistent, thorough, and reasonable EEOC interpretation
in light of the strength with which the majority credited the
presumption against extraterritoriality.8
A problem with the dissent's analysis, putting it at odds
with relevant caselaw, is its interpretation of Title VII's broad
jurisdictional language. To begin with, the dissent character85
ized the presumption against extraterritoriality as "weak.
In light of the way that the presumption has been articulated
in every case from CharmingBetsy to Foley Bros. and its prog79. Id. at 272 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 274-77 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that EEOC interpretations of Title VII support extraterritorial application).
81. See id. at 256 ("It is also reasonable to conclude that had Congress intended Title VII to apply overseas, it would have addressed the subject of conflicts
with foreign laws and procedures.") (emphasis added).
82. See id. at 256-59 (explaining why the EEOC's construction of Title VII
was "insufficiently weighty to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial
application").
83. The grounds upon which the majority rejected the EEOC's Title VII interpretation are particularly troubling in light of their supposed clear statement rule.
The majority examined the amount of deference that should be accorded an administrative agency like the EEOC and concluded that such deference "'will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.'" Id. at 257 (quoting
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-46 (1976)). The majority should
not have had to evaluate even a single one of these factors if all that mattered in
this area is the plain wording of the statute. See supra note 4 and accompanying
text.
84. These inconsistencies are not only an internal problem for this decision
but may have caused confusion among the circuits in Pico and Dowd that is the
subject of this Note, and will be discussed more fully later.
85. EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 265-66 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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eny, this characterization does not appear to be accurate. What
the dissent may have been trying to say is that since it would
allow a wider range of indications of congressional intent to
defeat the presumption, its reading of the presumption is
somewhat weaker than the majority's. While the presumption
against extraterritoriality may not be as great an obstacle as
the majority makes it out to be, with its newly articulated
clear statement rule, it is anything but weak.
The weakness of the dissent's analysis lies in its statement
that the "terms [of Title VII] are broad enough to encompass
discrimination by United States employers abroad. Nothing in
the text of the statute indicates that the protection of an
'individual' from employment discrimination depends on the
location of that individual's workplace.... ,,""
According to
this statement, any statute passed by Congress, not specifying
that it was solely for domestic application, could be applied
extraterritorially-the complete antithesis of the presumption
against extraterritoriality. While this quotation may be hyperbolic on the dissent's part in its opposition to the majority's
overly-restrictive clear statement rule, it does point out a conflict with previous caselaw, and a logical inconsistency in the
dissent's approach.
Also important in the dissent's Title VII interpretation are
the policy concerns with which it did not concern itself. Purporting to be free of any foreign policy or conflict of laws concerns, the dissent felt that the United States was well within
its rights to regulate U.S. corporations and the way they treat
U.S. citizens abroad."7 While it did not explicitly say so, the
dissent may have been concerned with protecting U.S. citizens
from discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin
when employed by U.S. companies abroad. Without having to
worry about foreign policy concerns, what policy concern could
be more compelling? Indeed, though again not explicitly stated,
perhaps the dissent was subordinating the comity concerns
that are so central to the presumption against extraterritoriality, to the policy concerns that militate against discrimination.
What is troubling about this latter scenario is that the dissent

86. Id. at 266 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 274 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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may be trying to balance competing policy concerns that would
better be left to the people's congressional representatives.
The Aramco dissent foreshadowed the confusion that the
majority decision would engender in the lower courts in two
ways. First, the dissent highlighted the majority's conflict with
earlier decisions, especially its selective quotation of Foley
Bros.,' which has never been overruled. The dissent also exposed the majority's internal inconsistencies when it mentioned the other sources of legislative intent that the majority
had discussed, exceeding the breadth of its own clear statement rule. 9 These problems would manifest themselves in
split decisions by the Second and Eleventh Circuits regarding
extraterritoriality the year following the Aramco decision.
B. Labor Union of Pico Korea, Ltd. .v. Pico Products, Inc.
The Pico case involved a union organized under the laws
of South Korea and made up wholly of South Korean nationals.9" The union wanted to sue the U.S. parent company of
the wholly-owned Korean subsidiary by which the union members were employed for contract violations by the subsidiary
under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).91 The
portion of the LMRA that addressed the issue of jurisdiction
provided, in pertinent part, that "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce... may
be brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties,... without regardto the citizenship
of the parties."2 The Second Circuit reversed a New York
Court of Appeals decision allowing adjudication of the suit, 3
and held that the dispute between the South Korean union
and the U.S. parent company, Pico Products, Inc., could not be
settled under U.S. law.9 4

88. Id. at 266 ("The majority converts the presumption against extraterritorial-

ity into a clear-statement rule in part through selective quotation.").
89. See id. at 271 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

90. Labor Union of Pico, Ltd. v. Pico Products, Inc., 968 F.2d 191, 192 (2d
Cir. 1992).
91. Id. at 192-93; Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 301(a), 29
U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (emphasis added).
93. Filardo v. Foley Bros., Inc., 297 N.Y. 217 (1948).
94. Pico, 968 F.2d at 193.
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The Pico court began its analysis by examining the broad
language of the statute quoted above and determined that the
issue of this case was whether Congress intended this sort of
labor contract to be covered by section 301 of the LMRA.9 5
The court then quoted Foley Bros.96 for the presumption
against extraterritoriality and Aramco for the proposition that
the plaintiff carries the burden of showing that Congress intended the statute to apply abroad.9" First, the court quickly
disposed of plaintiffs contention that the phrase "without regard to citizenship," in section 301 of the LMRA, alone gave
the court jurisdiction." The court found that this language
was simply an affirmation of federal question jurisdiction over
the dispute only when section 301 had been "triggered."9' The
court's methodology very much resembled the way that the
Aramco court dealt with the boiler plate language of Title
VII. 0 ° The Pico court came to the same conclusion regarding
this type of language when it stated that it "does not overcome
the broad presumption against extraterritorial application of
federal law."'0 '
Next, the court addressed plaintiffs argument that the
work performed by the employees represented by the South
Korean union may "affect commerce" within the meaning of
section 301 so as to provide for the extraterritorial application
of the LMRA.' °2 Here, the court cited Aramco for the idea
that boiler plate language may not overcome the presumption
against the extraterritorial application of U.S. labor laws.' 3
The court gave policy concerns as its motivation for construing
the LMRA not to apply to this situation, saying to do otherwise
"'would inevitably lead to embarrassment in foreign affairs and
be entirely infeasible in actual practice." '10 4 In this way, the

95. Id.
96. Id. at 194 (citing Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285).
97. Id. at 194 (citing EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 249 (1991)).
98. Id. at 194.
99. Id. "In other words, when it is triggered § 301 provides federal question
jurisdiction. The question before us is the threshold one: was § 301 triggered in
this case." Id.
100. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
101. Pico, 968 F.2d at 194.
102. Id. at 195.
103. Id. at 195 (citing EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 249-51 (1991)).
104. Id. at 195 (quoting McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 19 (1963)).
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Pico court remained truer to the policy concerns of Foley Bros.
and its progeny.
However, the Pico case is more remarkable for what it did
not address than what it did. That is to say, the analysis of the
Pico court was restricted to the face of the statute."5 There
was no examination of administrative interpretations, legislative history, or the scheme of the act-all of which figured
prominently in Foley Bros. and its progeny prior to Aramco.
Here, in contrast to the Foley Bros. line of cases, all the court
considered were the policy reasons behind the presumption
against extraterritoriality and the plain wording of the statute.
In this way, Pico, decided one year after Aramco, exemplified
the strict application of the clear statement rule the Aramco
court had formulated.
C. Dowd v. InternationalLongshoremen's Association
The Dowd case was much more complex than Pico and involved significantly more conduct on American soil. Dowd addressed the issue of whether a provision of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)'0 ° that prohibits secondary boycotts0 .
should apply where an American longshoremen's union had
persuaded its Japanese counterpart to threaten to refuse to
unload cargo ships loaded in the United States by non-union
labor.0 8 The court affirmed an injunction against the Inter-

105. "If Congress wants federal courts to enforce collective bargaining agreements between foreign workers and foreign corporations doing work in foreign
countries according to the body of labor law developed pursuant to § 301, such
legislative purpose must be made unmistakably clear. The statute evinces no such
purpose." Id. (emphasis added).
106. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
107. Id. at § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1988). Section 158(b) provides in pertinent part

that:
[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents . . . (4)(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in
commerce or an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an
object thereof is . . . (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using,
selling, hafidling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of
any other . . . person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to
recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of
his employees . . . Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B)

shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any
primary strike or primary picketing.
Id. (emphasis added).

108. Dowd v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 975 F.2d 779, 781-83 (11th
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national Longshoremen's Association (ILA) issued by the district court," 9 finding the existence of an unfair business practice as defined in the NLRA."' Though there were several
issues in Dowd, it is only the ILA's contention that there was
no jurisdiction under which to apply the anti-"secondary boycott" that will be addressed here. The ILA made this claim because the acts of which plaintiff complained did not occur within the territorial limits of the United States but in Japan."'
The ILA advanced a simple territorial"' argument
which, in short, stated that because the alleged secondary
boycott occurred in Japan, by and among Japanese nationals,
the boycott was beyond the scope of the NLRA."' Responding
to this argument, the court summarized the basic history of
the presumption against extraterritoriality citing Foley Bros.
and its progeny." Arriving at the same conclusion as
Aramco, Foley Bros., and all of the cases mentioned above, the
Dowd court stated that whether the NLRA would be applied
extraterritorially in this instance was purely a question of
congressional intent."5
The Dowd court's loose interpretation of Aramco is particularly notable in light of the strict rule that Aramco had supposedly established. The Dowd court wrote: 'The Court [in
Aramco] held that Title VII focuses purely upon domestic employment relationships and that the structure of the statute did
not suggest that Congress intended to regulate the termination
of an American citizen by an American employer where the
employee worked and was discharged in Saudi Arabia.""' 6
The Dowd court thus glossed over Aramco's clear statement
rule and looked to such things as the "focus," "structure," and
"suggestions" of Title VII-things the Aramco Court did not
consider. Reading Aramco broadly, the Dowd court allowed
Cir. 1992).

109. Dowd v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 781 F. Supp. 1565 (MID. Fla.
1991).
110. See Dowd, 975 F.2d at 781.
111. Id. at 783.
112. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402(1)(a) (1987).

113. Dowd, 975 F.2d at 787. The ILA cited Aramco to support this territorial
argument.
114. Id. at 787-88.
115. Id. at 787.
116. Id. at 787-88 (citing EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 245 (1991)) (emphasis added).
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itself considerable maneuverability regarding the policy considerations it would address in its decision.
While the above reading of Aramco seems to fly in the face
of that case's clear statement rule, perhaps the confusion of
that decision alluded to earlier played a part in the Dowd
court's interpretation.1 17 Though not cited in Dowd, perhaps
the mention of the lack of preparation for conflicts of law..
or the analysis of EEOC interpretations" 9 in Aramco sufficiently confused the Dowd court so that it was able to read
that decision broadly. One can speculate that perhaps the
Dowd court placed the policy of protecting innocent third parties from secondary boycotts above the comity concerns that
figured so prominently in the decisions from Foley Bros. to
Aramco.
The Dowd court distinguished cases such as Benz and
McCulloch, in part, by stating that the policy concerns present
20
in those cases simply were not present in the case at bar.
Instead the Dowd court took a decidedly instrumentalist approach, primarily concerned with achieving an equitable result.
The Dowd court stated that it would be "unsophisticated" to
allow an American union to get away with violating the NLRA
simply because it persuaded a foreign proxy to do its bidding. 12' The court looked to the evil that the NLRA was designed to remedy and determined that Congress intended "to
protect persons in commerce from a secondary boycott."12 2
Purporting to be free of the policy concerns of Foley Bros. and
its progeny, as well as Aramco, the Dowd court did not even
address the broad "in commerce" term of the NLRA that was of
such central importance in previous cases."as The broad congressional objective of preventing secondary boycotts against
innocent parties seemed to provide all the justification that the

117. "The longstanding tradition of restraint in applying the laws of this country to ships of a foreign country-a tradition that lies at the heart of Benz and

every subsequent decision-therefore is irrelevant in this case." Id. at 788 (citing
International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 221 (1982)).
118. See supra note 6.
119. See supra note 7.
120. See Dowd, 975 F.2d at 788-89.
121. "ILA would have us hold that conduct occurring outside the geographic
boundaries of the United States may not be reached by the NLRA, without regard
to the origin of the actors or the intent and effect of the conduct." Id. at 788.
122. Id. at 789 (emphasis added).
123. See, e.g., supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
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to conclude that the NLRA applied

124

The Dowd court buttressed its policy analysis by focusing
on the intent and effect of the defendant's conduct.' This
intent and effect doctrine allows a court to exercise jurisdiction
outside of U.S. territorial limits if an actor intended the unlaw126
ful effect of his conduct to occur within the United States.
The court also applied a theory which holds that conduct substantially occurring within the geographic territory of the United States may be subject to American jurisdiction. 27 This latter analysis went so far as to characterize the situation in
Dowd as domestic as opposed to extraterritorial. The use of
this theory may be a further attempt by the court to distinguish the case at bar from those which had previously articulated and applied the presumption against extraterritoriality.
In this way, the court became free to achieve what it believed
was a just
result despite the presumption against extraterrito128
riality.

D. Analysis
A comparison of Pico and Dowd reveals the types of confusion that the Aramco decision engendered in the Circuit Courts
of Appeal. The first difference is the way in which the two
courts addressed the policy concerns inherent in the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws. A second difference is the way
the courts viewed the consequences of their respective exercises of jurisdiction over their cases. While Dowd looked to the
result that was to be achieved by its exercise of jurisdiction for
any foreign policy conflicts, Pico said the exercise of such jurisdiction should be avoided regardless of the result precisely due
to the policy concerns associated with the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Finally, both courts differed in their charac124. "Since the object and effect of the conduct in question was to implement a
secondary boycott within the United States, we do not believe the location of that
conduct is determinative." Dowd, 975 F.2d at 790.
125. See id. at 789-90; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402(1Xc)
(1987).
126. Id. § 402 cmt. d.
127. Id. § 402(1)(a).
128. The Dowd court also points out that the impact of this decision is upon a
domestic union that is subject to domestic jurisdiction anyway. Dowd, 975 F.2d at
788.
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terizations of their respective cases. Pico explicitly stated that
the dispute at hand was of a predominantly foreign nature,
while Dowd made very sure that its exercise of jurisdiction was
proper by attempting to characterize the case at bar as a territorial one.
Dowd took a different approach than both Pico and
Aramco to the policy concerns associated with the presumption
against extraterritoriality. The court began by framing the
issue of whether a violation of the NLRA had occurred as one
of "purpose" and "effect" to cause a secondary boycott within
the territory of the. United States. 12 The court stated that
the geographic location where the conduct occurred was not as
important as "the origin of the actors or the intent, or effect, of
the conduct."130 Looking to cases such as Benz, the Dowd
court concluded that the policy concerns that figured promi131
nently in those cases were not present in the case before it.
Pico's approach to the policy concerns associated with the
presumption against extraterritoriality differs in several important ways from Dowd. Pico asserted that the plain wording
of the statute may have allowed jurisdiction absent the policy32
concerns present when applying a law extraterritorially.1
When interpreting the broad language of a statute, the Pico
court revealed its sensitivity to foreign policy concerns when it
expressed its concern that "[iun the present 'global economy'
ever-expanding trade makes it increasingly possible that foreign industry might affect commerce 'between [a] foreign country and any State.' 1 33 However, just because these foreign
industries may affect U.S. commerce, the court stated that

129. Id. at 781.
130. Id. at 788.
131. Id. ("The Benz cases do not represent generally applicable boundaries of
commerce, but instead a judgment that Congress did not intend to interfere with
the internal operation of foreign vessels."); see EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 261
(1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
132. As the Pico court stated:
A rigid and literal reading of this provision might permit the instant action to lie. But since the extraterritorial application of our laws is not
favored because such may readily lead to inadvertent clashes with the
laws of other nations, we cannot presume Congress intended a Korean

labor contract to come within § 301's compass.
Labor Union of Pico Korea, Ltd. v. Pico Products, Inc., 968 F.2d 191, 192 (2d Cir.
1992) (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 195 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1988)).
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jurisdiction must be declined because "constru[ing] § 301 as
governing collective bargaining agreements in such an industry
'would inevitably lead to embarrassment in foreign affairs and
be entirely infeasible in actual practice.""'
While the Pico court looked to the means of obtaining

jurisdiction for any foreign policy conflicts, the Dowd court
focused on the result that exercising such jurisdiction would
have. According to Dowd's analysis, no harm would be done as
long as an American entity was being regulated. 15 If one
were to use the Pico analysis, a Dowd-like result would have
been likely since the plaintiff in Pico sought relief against two
American parent companies. The difference in policy assessments between the two courts-one that looks at means, the
other that looks at ends-may possibly be attributed to the
Aramco decision which failed to clarify exactly which judicial
practice offends foreign policy concerns-the means of achieving jurisdiction over a foreign act or the result of regulating a
foreign entity. If it is the former, then the Dowd court is clearly wrong in exercising jurisdiction over this act that occurred
substantially outside of U.S. territory. However, if it is the
latter, then both Pico and Aramco are flawed since the results
achieved would have fallen upon American entities.
It was the alleged freedom from these policy concerns that
allowed the Dowd court to reach what it believed to be a just
result, while the presence of these policy concerns precluded
the Pico court from even reaching the issue. The Aramco court
paid little attention to the underlying controversy in that case,
a Title VII discrimination suit where the employer was accused
of egregious conduct, and focused almost exclusively upon the
policy concerns associated with the presumption against
extraterritoriality.136 Similarly, the Pico court's only mention

of the underlying dispute was in its summary of the district

134. Id. (quoting McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras,
372 U.S. 10, 19 (1963)).
135. The Dowd court stated that the issue of whether it had jurisdiction over
the Japanese unions involved in the case was not before it. However, had it been,
it seems rather clear that these unions would have fallen under the jurisdiction of

U.S. federal courts according to its "purpose and effect" analysis. See Dowd v.
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 975 F.2d 779, 790 n.10 (11th Cir. 1992).
136. EEOC v. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 245 (1991) (limiting mention of underlying
controversy to perfunctory summary of facts as alleged in plaintiffs complaint).
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court's findings of fact.'37 The fact that the defendant in that
case was owned by an American parent company was not
deemed relevant to the consideration of whether that collective
bargaining
agreement was to fall under § 301 of the
138
LMIRA.

In contrast, the nature of the dispute in Dowd figured very
prominently in that court's evaluation of the jurisdictional
issue. The Dowd court stated that a U.S. union could not avoid
the penalties of U.S. law simply by soliciting a foreign entity to
do its bidding.'39 Once the court had determined that the
purpose and effect of the conduct occurring outside U.S. borders was to improperly influence a primary labor dispute within the United States, the Dowd court stated that the NLRB, by
issuing its injunction, was simply trying to halt the evil that
the statute was designed to remedy. 4 Focusing on the underlying dispute and looking to the practical result of its decision, the Dowd court achieved what it deemed a just result,
though in the same situation the Aramco and Pico courts may
have found jurisdiction lacking, regardless of the result to be
achieved in those cases.
The Pico and Dowd courts differed in the characterizations
of their respective underlying disputes. The Pico court made it
exceedingly clear that this dispute was of a foreign nature with
the bulk of the acts of which plaintiff complained having been
committed upon foreign soil.' In contrast, Dowd attempted
to show that the underlying dispute of its case could arguably
be considered territorial. 4 ' One may wonder why the Dowd
court needed to make this argument since it had so convincingly stated that it had jurisdiction over the act under the "purpose and effect" doctrine. Perhaps the court was trying to
shield itself from reversal by leaving an alternate ground upon
which to decide the case.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Pico, 968 F.2d at 192-93.
Id. at 194.
Dowd, 975 F.2d at 789-90.
See id. at 789.
See Pico, 968 F.2d at 192-93.
See Dowd, 975 F.2d at 789.
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III. CONCLUSION
With the collapse of Communism, the emergence of viable
Third World markets, and the expansion of regional and world
free trade agreements, the extraterritorial application of U.S.
labor laws will continue to become a much more prominent
problem than it already is today. Congress should have the
final say on what competing policy interests should prevail in
this sensitive area because it is the most politically accountable branch of our government. It would be a terrible mistake
for the judiciary to decide when to apply U.S. labor laws
extraterritorially because it lacks accountability to American
workers and businesses alike, as well as the resources needed
to evaluate which competing interests should prevail in this
area. In this way, the Aramco clear statement standard is
necessary, viable, and workable.
The logical inconsistencies in Aramco that have caused a
conflict among the circuit courts of appeal are not the only
problems apparent in that decision. As long as the Supreme
Court purports to follow precedent, it will continue to cause
inconsistent interpretations and applications of its clear statement standard. The Court should be forthcoming and state
that it has modified Foley Bros. and its progeny by requiring
congressional intent to apply a law extraterritorially to explicitly appear on the face of the statute. The Court should also
remain true to its clear statement rule and limit its examination of congressional intent solely to the face of the statute.
Until the Court does so, there will continue to be dissension
among the ranks of the federal courts.
This dissension will only prove a disservice to American
labor and industry. Workers will not clearly know what their
rights are while employed by U.S. businesses abroad and
American businesses will not be certain as to what their obligations are under U.S. law. This uncertainty will cause instability for American workers and businesses alike at a time
when certainty and stability are needed so that Americans can
make better cost evaluations in deciding whether to go abroad
in the first place. Adding stability to these cost evaluations will
help U.S. businesses compete in an ever more demanding
world market while informing American workers of their rights
when abroad.
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The clear statement standard should be maintained by the
Supreme Court because it makes the most politically accountable branch-the legislature-responsible for making law in
this sensitive area. Judicial activism will only work a hardship
on American businesses and workers by adding to the uncertainty behind U.S. labor laws as well as having the potential to
create foreign policy problems for the United States. The judiciary lacks the requisite power to decide what competing policies should prevail in U.S. business and labor relations abroad.
Whether these competing interests are lower costs of doing
business versus social concerns for American workers or American intervention in another country's affairs versus foreign
policy restraint, the legislative branch has the necessary resources and jurisdiction to hear both sides of these controversies and decide which should prevail. Anything less would
remove this area of law from the most politically accountable
branch of our government (the legislature) to the least (the
judiciary) in an area where American workers and corporations, not American jurists, most need to be heard.
James Mathieu

